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Abstract
Background: Excessive healthcare payments can impede access to health services and also disrupt the welfare of
households with no financial protection. Health insurance is expected to offer financial protection against health
shocks. Ghana began the implementation of its National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2004. The NHIS is
aimed at removing the financial barrier to healthcare by limiting direct out-of-pocket health expenditures
(OOPHE). The study examines the effect of the NHIS on OOPHE and how it protects households against
catastrophic health expenditures.
Methods: Data was obtained from a cross-sectional representative household survey involving 2,430 households
from three districts across Ghana. All OOPHE associated with treatment seeking for reported illness in the
household in the last 4 weeks preceding the survey were analysed and compared between insured and uninsured
persons. The incidence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditures (CHE) among households were measured
by the catastrophic health payment method. The relative effect of NHIS on the incidence of CHE in the household
was estimated by multiple logistic regression analysis.
Results: About 36% of households reported at least one illness during the 4 weeks period. Insured patients had
significantly lower direct OOPHE for out-patient and in-patient care compared to the uninsured. On financial
protection, the incidence of CHE was lower among insured households (2.9%) compared to the partially insured
(3.7%) and the uninsured (4.0%) at the 40% threshold. The incidence of CHE was however significantly lower
among fully insured households (6.0%) which sought healthcare from NHIS accredited health facilities compared
to the partially insured (10.1%) and the uninsured households (23.2%). The likelihood of a household incurring
CHE was 4.2 times less likely for fully insured and 2.9 times less likely for partially insured households relative
to being uninsured. The NHIS has however not completely eliminated OOPHE for the insured and their
households.
Conclusion: The NHIS has significant effect in reducing OOPHE and offers financial protection against CHE for
insured individuals and their households though they still made some out-of-pocket payments. Efforts should
aim at eliminating OOPHE for the insured if the objective for establishing the NHIS is to be achieved.
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Background
In 2000, the World Health Organisation (WHO) recog-
nised fairness in health finance as one of its three core
health system goals [1]. Fairness in health financing and
protection against financial risk suggest that accessing
healthcare should not impose untold hardship on af-
fected households [2]. Promoting fairness through health
system financing arrangements therefore has a wider so-
cial value as its implication goes beyond improving health
status [3]. It is estimated that globally, about 150 million
people face catastrophic healthcare expenditures (CHE)
annually because of direct payments for healthcare while
about 100 million are driven into poverty [4]. This is
mainly because such people lack prepayment schemes and
have to pay for healthcare at the point of service.
A well-functioning prepayment arrangement which fa-
cilitates effective risk-pooling and risk-sharing among
the population including the poor has been identified as
having a strong potential to improve financial protection
against illness [4–6]. Some studies have however found
partial or no impact of health insurance on out-of-
pocket health expenditures (OOPHE) and catastrophic
health expenditures depending on the structure and ser-
vices offered by the scheme [7–11].
In Ghana, the introduction of user fees in the health
sector in the 1980s and 1990s impeded access to health
services, imposed a heavy financial burden on house-
holds and often led to worse health outcomes for major-
ity of the population [12–15]. As a response to address
these adverse effects, the National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS) was introduced in 2004 following the
passage of the National Health Insurance (NHI) Act
(Act 650) in 2003 [16]. According to the NHI Act 650,
Ghana was to establish a national health insurance pol-
icy that ‘ensures access to basic healthcare services to all
residents’ [17]. The NHIS is therefore aimed at removing
the financial barrier to health services by limiting
OOPHE [18].
Membership in the NHIS is mandatory for all resi-
dents of the country including foreign nationals legally
resident in Ghana [17]. To become a valid card holding
member of the NHIS, it is necessary to actively register
and pay a registration fee. Formal sector employees who
contribute to the Social Security and National Insurance
Trust (SSNIT), a mandatory 2.5% deduction is made on
their social security contributions as their premium [16].
Adults (18–69 years) in the informal sector pay an an-
nual premium of between 7.2 Ghana Cedis (US$4.8 in
March, 2011) and Gh¢ 48.0 (US$32.0) depending on the
district of registration [19]. Children under 18 years,
pregnant women, elderly (≥70 years), SSNIT pensioners
and indigents are exempted from paying the premium
[17]. The NHIS has a comprehensive benefit package
that covers about 95% of the country’s disease conditions
[20]. The benefit package covers outpatient services, in-
patient care and maternity care among others. The
NHIS has an exclusion list of health problems which in-
clude cancer treatment other than breast and cervical
cancers, HIV retroviral drugs, dialysis for chronic renal
failure, among other tertiary services.
Formal health care services in Ghana are delivered
through an integrated and multilevel health system com-
prising of a hierarchy of health facilities [21]. At the base
are the Community Health Planning and Services
(CHPS) zones followed by health centers at the sub-
district level. These facilities provide mainly primary and
community health services. At the next levels are the
district and regional hospitals providing both primary
and secondary services. At the apex are the tertiary hos-
pitals which provide tertiary services [22]. There are over
4,069 health facilities in Ghana including CHPS, clinics,
hospitals, maternity homes, pharmacies and laboratories.
Health care services for NHIS members are provided by
about 3,575 health facilities which have been accredited by
the National Health Insurance Authority [23]. About 54%
of the accredited health facilities are owned by government
(i.e. publicly owned) while 39.8% are privately owned. Reli-
gious bodies owned 5.8% while quasi-governmental institu-
tions owned the remaining 0.8% [23].
About 34% of Ghana’s population of 24.6 million are
valid card holding members (i.e. active members) of the
NHIS [19]. The NHIS has become the dominant source
of internally generated funds (IGF) to health facilities,
accounting for 79.4% of IGF in 2010 [24]. At the na-
tional level, the NHIS appears to be contributing to a
decline in OOPHE. OOPHE as a percentage of total
health expenditure has declined from 47% in 2000 to
30% in 2007 but went up to 37% in 2009 [21]. In 2011,
the percentage was 29.1% and still far higher than the
15%-20% threshold recommended by the WHO [4]. This
situation has been described as ‘appearing problematic’
because there is a strong correlation between the ratio
of OOP health expenditures to total health expenditures
and the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures
among households [21, 22, 25].
At the household level, evidence of the effect of the
NHIS on financial protection is scanty in Ghana though
that is one of the core objectives of the NHIS [26, 27].
In an earlier study to assess the financial protection ef-
fect of the NHIS on households in Ghana, Nguyen et al.
[26] reported that the NHIS significantly reduced the
probability of catastrophic health expenditure by 0.5 to 1
percentage point depending on whether non-food ex-
penditure or household income was used for the estima-
tion. The study however observed that NHIS members
made OOP payments even at NHIS accredited health fa-
cilities. In all, the insured made OOPHE which equalled
72% of what was incurred by the non-members. Since
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the study was conducted in the early stages of the im-
plementation of the NHIS in 2007, some of the ob-
served problems (e.g. shortages of drugs, payment for
services and drugs that should be covered by insurance,
payment for uncovered drugs and tests, etc.) were at-
tributed to teething problems associated with the imple-
mentation [26, 28].
After ten years of implementation of the NHIS, it is
imperative to assess the effect of the NHIS on house-
hold’s OOPHE in Ghana. A positive answer to the ques-
tion on whether health insurance reduces OOPHE
‘would be essential to argue that health insurance can
help prevent people from sliding into health-related pov-
erty’ [6]. Against this background, we hypothesise that
individuals insured with the NHIS would have signifi-
cantly lower direct OOPHE when ill and their house-
holds are less likely to incur catastrophic health care
expenditures compared to the uninsured.
Methods
Study design
This study was conducted in three selected districts
across the three main ecological zones of Ghana. The
districts were Kwaebibirem in the southern zone, Asutifi
in the middle zone and Savelugu-Nanton in the northern
zone. The data was cross-sectional and representative of
households in the three districts based on the Ghana
Statistical Service’s demarcation and mapping for each
district. Twenty-seven (27) representative rural and
urban census enumeration areas (EAs) were sampled
and surveyed in each district. Assisted by the district
statisticians with the EA maps, all households in each
EA were listed. The complete list of households in each
EA constituted the sampling frame from which 30 house-
holds were systematically sampled and interviewed. This
resulted in a total of 810 households per district and 2,430
households in the three districts. The survey was con-
ducted between February and April, 2011.
A household questionnaire was developed and admin-
istered to the household head by trained field enumera-
tors. The household questionnaire had modules which
covered household’s demographic profile, socioeconomic
status, health insurance status of all members, general
health of household members, household expenditures
and household dwelling characteristics as well as assets
ownership. The health module collected information on
all reported illnesses and injuries which occurred in the
household in the last 4 weeks preceding the survey. For
households which reported an illness/injury, information
was collected on the symptoms or type of illness/injury
experienced and perceived severity of the illness/injury.
Individuals who reported ill/injured were asked whether
they sought health care and the source of treatment. All
direct OOP expenditures associated with treatment
seeking for the reported illness/injury were recorded.
The direct OOP health expenditures included fees for
consultation, diagnostic tests, medicines, medical supplies
and all non-medical expenses including travel expenses,
subsistence cost at the facility and all other related pay-
ments. Those who sought healthcare from outside the for-
mal health system (self-medication, purchase of medicines
from drug stores, traditional medicine, etc.) also reported
all direct OOP expenditures made.
The household expenditure module gathered informa-
tion on all expenditures made by the household during
the past 4 weeks or 12 months depending on the nature
of the expenditure item. The components included food
and non-food expenditures including imputed values for
home produced items such as food and housing as used
in the Ghana Living Standard Surveys [29]. The health
expenditures component of the non-food expenditures
sub-group included all health and medical expenditures
incurred during the period as well as expenditures on
medical products, therapeutic appliances and equipment,
health insurance premiums and fees as well as expendi-
tures on preventive health such as the purchase of mos-
quito nets and repellents [29, 30]. All expenditures with
recall periods of more than 4 weeks were adjusted to get
estimates for the 4 week reference period.
Information was also collected on type of health facil-
ities in the three districts. The Kwaebibirem district with
a population of about 200,000 had one district hospital
and two other non-governmental hospitals. There were
three health centres, two clinics and 23 Community-
based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) compounds.
The Asutifi district with a population of 114,029 had 16
health facilities consisting of one mission hospital which
serves as the district hospital, four public health centres,
two clinics, four CHPS compounds and five private
clinics. The Savelugu-Nanton district had one public dis-
trict hospital, one private hospital, three health centres,
five clinics and three CHPS compounds.
Ethical approval for the survey was obtained from the
Institutional Review Board of the Noguchi Memorial
Institute for Medical Research of the University of
Ghana with a certified protocol number 069/11-12. In-
formed consent was also sought from all participating
households.
Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses for the paper were conducted on in-
dividual and household levels. At the individual level,
the impact of the NHIS on OOPHE (direct cost of ill-
ness) was examined. The individual direct cost of illness
was calculated as the sum of all the direct OOPHE on
medical and nonmedical items related to the reported
illness/injury [31, 32]. We compared the mean OOPHE
by insured and uninsured sick persons. At the individual
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level, the analysis was based on the cost per illness epi-
sode from a single visit to the health facility.
At the household level financial protection was
assessed by measuring the incidence and intensity of fi-
nancial catastrophe due to OOPHE in the household for
the reference period using the standard methods by
O’Donnell et al. [33]. Household’s total out-of-pocket
health expenditure (T) is defined as catastrophic if it ex-
ceeds a specified fraction (threshold) of total household
expenditure (x) or total non-food expenditure [x-f (x)]. It
is common to set this threshold (z) at 10% of total ex-
penditure or 40% of total non-food expenditure [33–35].
We defined financial catastrophe in relation to total
household non-food expenditure by using the 20% and
40% thresholds. The incidence of catastrophic health ex-
penditure (CHE) which is referred to as the catastrophic
payment headcount (H), measures the proportion of the
sampled households whose OOPHE as a fraction of their
total non-food expenditures exceeds the specified
threshold (z). The catastrophic payment headcount (H)
is estimated by
H ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1Ei; ð1Þ
where N is the sample size and E is an indicator variable
which equals 1 if a household (i) is classified as having in-
curred catastrophic health expenditure (Ti/[xi-f (xi)] > z)
and 0 if otherwise. The catastrophic payment headcount
(H) however does not show the extent to which house-
holds incurring CHE exceeds the specified threshold. This
is measured by the catastrophic payment overshoot (O)
which shows the intensity of the catastrophic OOP health
expenditure. The intensity therefore measures the average
degree by which the OOP health expenditures as a frac-
tion of total non-food expenditures exceed the specified
threshold for all the sampled households. The overshoots
(O) is defined as Oi = Ei ((Ti / [xi-f (xi)]-z). For the sampled
households, the catastrophic payment overshoot (O) is
estimated by
O ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1Oi: ð2Þ
The incidence (H) and the intensity or overshoot (O) are
related through the mean positive overshoot (MPO=O/H).
The MPO measures the mean overshoot among house-
holds making CHE at a specified threshold in the sample.
Results are compared among uninsured, partially insured
and fully insured households to assess any significant effect
of the NHIS. The household is defined as a person or a
group of persons, who live together in the same dwelling,
sharing the same house-keeping arrangements and are
catered for as one unit [29]. The household was uninsured
if none of its members was a member of the NHIS, partially
insured if at least one member was insured or fully insured
if all the members were insured at the time of the survey.
Finally, we explored the determinants of catastrophic
health expenditure in the household by estimating bin-
ary logistic regression models. The purpose was to as-
certain the independent effect of health insurance on
the occurrence of CHE in the household by controlling
for other confounding variables. The probability (P) of
a household incurring CHE (y) is specified as: P (y =
1|x) = exp (β’x) / 1 + exp (β’x), where the dependent
variable y = 1 if the household incurred CHE and y = 0 if
the household did not incur CHE, x is a vector of the in-
dependent variables, β is the parameters [36]. The litera-
ture suggests that the probability of a household incurring
CHE is a function of its socio-demographic characteristics
such as the size and age composition, place of residence,
health status of members, health insurance status of mem-
bers, economic status (e.g. wealth status), type and place
of treatment as well as the characteristics of the household
head [37–41]. The household wealth status was generated
by Principal Components Analysis (PCA) based on thirty-
two items including households’ dwelling characteristics,
access to utilities and ownership of consumer durables.
Weights from the first principal component were used to
generate the household wealth quintiles [42]. Two mul-
tiple logistic regression models were estimated. Model 1
was estimated for all households (2,418) while Model 2
was restricted to only users of NHIS accredited facilities
for the recent reported illness (584). The model goodness-
of-fit was assessed using Hosmer–Lemeshow test and the
results showed that they were satisfactory (p = 0.1936 for
model1 and p = 0.4711 for model 2) [43]. All statistical
analyses were performed using Stata 12.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The results show that 9.8% (1,082) of the 11,089 house-
hold members in 36% of the surveyed households re-
ported sick in the last four weeks preceding the survey.
About 14.7% (633) of the insured household members
compared to 6.6% (449) of the uninsured reported sick
(Table 1). Nearly 50% of the uninsured sick were chil-
dren compared to about 39% among the insured sick
while there was a higher proportion of the elderly
among the insured sick persons (p < 0.01). Fever/malaria
was the commonest illness reported (39.0%). This was
followed by gastrointestinal tract disorders (14.2 %) and
musculoskeletal related complaints (11.6 %). The rest
were disorders of the cardiovascular system (5.8%), skin
disorders (5.1%) and injuries (3.7%) among others.
Nearly 95% of the sick reported to have sought health
care for their illnesses with no significant difference be-
tween the uninsured (93.8%) and the insured (95.3%).
There was however a significant difference when it
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of household members who reported sick by their health insurance status
Variable Insurance status Total (n = 1,082) % N Pearson’s χ2
Uninsured (n = 449) % Insured (n = 633) %
District
Asutifi 35.2 44.9 40.9 442 26.038***
Kwaebibirem 34.5 37.8 36.4 394
Savelugu-Nanton 30.3 17.4 22.7 246
Age (years)
< 18 yrs 49.4 38.9 43.2 468 25.729***
18-69 45.4 47.5 46.7 505
≥ 70 5.1 13.6 10.1 109
Sex
Male 47.4 38.4 42.1 456 8.824***
Female 52.6 61.6 57.9 624
Illness/symptoms
Fever/malaria 40.6 37.9 39.0 422 28.651***
Gastrointestinal tract disorders 17.2 12.2 14.2 154
Musculoskeletal related 9.8 13.0 11.7 126
Injuries 3.4 3.9 3.7 40
Respiratory system disorders 2.5 3.0 2.8 30
Skin disorders 6.8 3.9 5.1 55
Cardiovascular system disorders 2.5 8.1 5.9 63
Eye infection 2.3 3.0 2.7 29
Obstetric related complaints 0.9 1.9 1.5 16
Other 14.1 13.3 13.6 147
Perceived severity
Very serious 24.4 29.1 27.2 292 4.422
Somewhat serious 50.2 50.0 50.1 538
Not serious 25.3 20.9 22.7 244
% of sick who sought care 93.8 95.3 94.6 1,024 1.160
Source of treatment (for those who sought any care)
Regional/District hospital 19.5 39.3 31.4 317 117.423***
Public Health centre 17.2 28.4 24.0 242
CHPS 2.8 3.0 2.9 29
Private hospital/clinic 7.8 15.3 12.3 124
Informal 52.8 14.0 29.4 296
% that recovered after first visit 97.3 92.6 94.5 968 10.628***
% of inpatient (hospitalisation) 5.2 10.9 8.6 93 10.823***
% that received all prescribed medicines
from NHIS accredited facilities
87.2 87.8 87.7 611 0.835
Mode of transport to place of treatment
Foot 58.7 47.5 51.9 515 30.746***
Bicycle 4.4 2.5 3.2 32
Motorcycle 5.1 5.0 5.0 50
Car/bus 29.5 44.7 38.7 384
Truck 2.3 0.3 1.1 11
Source: Authors; household survey, 2011
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
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comes to the source of treatment chosen (p < 0.01). A
significant proportion of the insured (39.3%) compared
to 19.5% of the uninsured sought health care from the
regional and district hospitals. More than half (52.7%) of
the uninsured sought health care from informal sources
including traditional sources, self treatment and pur-
chase of unprescribed medicines from drugstores.
Only 8.6% of the sick were hospitalised with a higher
proportion among the insured (10.9%) than the uninsured
(5.2%) (p < 0.01). A similar proportion (87%) of uninsured
and insured patients received all their prescribed medi-
cines from the NHIS accredited facilities visited. Majority
(51.9 %) of the sick visited the place of treatment on foot
while 40% went by a car or bus. The insured were more
likely (44.7%) to travel by car or bus to seek health care
than the uninsured (29.5%) (p < 0.01).
Direct cost of illness for treatment sought by health
insurance status
Table 2 presents the mean direct cost of illness for treat-
ment sought for insured and uninsured sick persons.
The total direct cost of out-patient care including both
medical and nonmedical costs for the recent illness was
significantly higher among the uninsured (Gh¢25.50/
US$17.00) compared to the Gh¢6.65 (US$4.43) for in-
sured patients (p < 0.01). The direct medical cost of out-
patient care incurred by the uninsured was 10.8 times
(Gh¢21.30/US$14.20) higher than that of the insured
(Gh¢1.97/US$1.31). The insured however recorded a
higher cost for the cost of prescribed drugs purchased
from outside the health facility visited though the differ-
ence was not statistically significant (Gh¢14.27/US$9.51
vs. Gh¢10.62/US$7.08, p > 0.1). Though transport cost
for seeking out-patient care was generally low (Gh¢1.57/
US$1.05), it was significantly higher for the insured com-
pared to the uninsured (Gh¢2.11/US$1.41 vs. Gh¢1.28/
US$0.85, p < 0.01). It is however important to note that
transport costs are not covered by the NHIS.
For the few respondents who sought in-patient care
(8.6%), the uninsured incurred a significantly higher total
direct cost (Gh¢86.73/US$57.81) than the insured (Gh¢
44.25/US$29.49) (p < 0.01). Finally, there was no signifi-
cant difference in the total direct cost for those who
sought care from informal sources though the insured
paid a little higher (Gh¢6.41/US$4.27) than the unin-
sured (Gh¢5.58/US$.72).
Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health
expenditures at the household level
The results show that 46.2% of the households interviewed
were uninsured. About 26% were partially insured while
28.2% were fully insured. The households’ mean monthly
non-food expenditure was significantly higher for fully in-
sured households (Gh¢111.74/US$74.48) compared to the
uninsured households (Gh¢97.77/US$65.17) (p < 0.01).
The partially insured households recorded the highest
mean OOPHE (Gh¢13.02/US$8.68) during the reference
period (Table 3). About 44% of the partially insured and
fully insured households reported at least one acute illness
in the last four weeks preceding the survey compared to
only 25.5% of the uninsured households (p < 0.01). A sig-
nificant proportion of the fully and partially insured
households reported to have at least a member with a
chronic illness (p < 0.01).
Table 4 presents the incidence (headcount) and intensity
(overshoot) of catastrophic health expenditures (CHEs)
Table 2 Mean direct cost of illness by type of care sought and health insurance status (in Ghana cedisa)
Variable Insurance status T-statb Frequency (n)
All Uninsured Insured All Uninsured Insured
Out-patient services cost
Total direct cost of illness (medical & nonmedical) 11.67 (18.85) 25.50 (38.21) 6.65 (15.61) 8.661*** 619 167 452
Total direct medical cost at NHIS facility (excluding non-medical costs) 7.19 (24.69) 21.30 (42.88) 1.97 (7.60) 9.209*** 619 167 452
Cost of prescribed drugs bought from outside facility 13.16 (19.67) 10.62 (9.21) 14.27 (22.80) −0.636 56 17 39
Transport cost 1.57 (4.73) 1.28 (4.37) 2.11 (4.95) 2.641*** 619 167 452
Inpatient services cost
Total direct cost of illness (medical & nonmedical) 66.62 (66.26) 86.73 (87.48) 44.25 (53.22) 2.478*** 71 19 52
Total direct medical cost at facility (excluding nonmedical costs) 23.63 (41.12) 54.64 (59.73) 12.20 (24.07) 3.686*** 52 14 38
Transport cost 6.47 (8.52) 5.39 (4.95) 6.93 (9.69) −0.582 50 15 35
Informal care costc
Total direct cost of illness 4.79 (7.20) 5.58 (5.77) 6.41 (7.97) −0.738 280 196 84
Authors; computed from household survey data, 2011
Notes: Figures in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals
aIn Ghana cedis. US$1 = 1.5003 in March, 2011
b*Significant at 10% (p < 0.1); **Significant at 5% (p < 0.05); ***Significant at 1% (p < 0.01)
cInformal sources of treatment included traditional care, self treatment and purchase of unprescribed drugs from chemical shops
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among the surveyed households. For all households in the
sample, 11.4% (275) of them incurred CHEs at the 20%
threshold with no significant difference in terms of their
insurance status (p = 0.444). The MPO shows that the un-
insured households which made CHEs at the 20% thresh-
old on the average spent 39.4% (20% + 19.45%) of their
total monthly non-food expenditure on health care com-
pared to 36.44% (20% + 14.44%) among the partially in-
sured and 34.9% (20% + 14.86%) among the fully insured
households. At the 40% threshold, 3.6% (88) of the house-
holds made CHE (i.e. Uninsured = 3.7%, Partially and Fully
insured = 2.9%). For these households incurring CHE at
the 40%, the fully insured households exceeded the thresh-
old by 14.3% compared to 16.7% for the uninsured and
20.5% for the partially insured though the difference was
not statistically significant (p = 0.323).
Restricting the analysis to only the users of NHIS
accredited health facilities for the recent illness/injury
revealed the significant effect of the NHIS on OOP
health expenditures. At the 40% threshold, 11.1% (65) of
the households made CHE but it was as high as 23.2%
(29) among the uninsured compared to only about
6.0%% (15) among the fully insured households (p <
0.001). The fully insured household also had the lowest
MPO of 15.7% though the difference was not significant
(p = 0.790).
Determinants of catastrophic health expenditure at the
household level
The multiple logistic regression estimates for all the sur-
veyed households (Model 1) showed that the number of
children under five years in the household, household
size, health status of household members, sex of the
household head, longer distance to the nearest health fa-
cility and more importantly the health insurance status
of the household were all significant determinants of
CHE by households (Table 5). For instance, households
with at least one member having a chronic illness were
94% higher than those without a chronic illness in incur-
ring CHE. Households which experienced hospitalisation
of a member were over 7.0 times more likely than those
without hospitalisation to incur CHE in both models.
The results from the two models showed that mem-
bership in the NHIS significantly reduced the probability
of a household experiencing CHE. Partially insured
households were 2.9 times less likely to experience CHE
while fully insured households were 4.2 times less likely
after controlling for other variables (Model 1). Restrict-
ing the analysis to only households which sought health
care from NHIS accredited health facilities for the re-
cent reported illness (Model 2) revealed that fully in-
sured households were 5.5 times less likely to incur
CHE while the partially insured were 2.8% less likely. Fi-
nally, households living more than five kilometres from
the nearest NHIS accredited health facility were 1.9
times more likely to incur CHE relative to those within
less than two kilometres.
Discussion
This study examines the extent to which Ghana’s
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) protects its
members against the financial consequences of ill-health.
The results show that the insured persons were more
likely to seek formal health care when ill and also have
significantly lower direct OOPHE because of the NHIS.
Though the insured patients were more likely to travel
to the health facilities by car and therefore incurred rela-
tively higher travel expenses, they still had lower mean
OOPHE. This could suggest that with the elimination or
reduction in OOPHE at NHIS accredited health facil-
ities, the insured patients could afford to travel to seek
appropriate health care when sick. In a recent study in
Table 3 Summary of household non-food expenditure, OOPHE and health conditions
Variable Health insurance status Total (n =
2,418)
F-Testb
Uninsured (n = 1,117) Partially insured (n = 620) Fully insured (n = 681)
Mean household non-food expenditure (Gh¢)a 97.77 (76.15) 117.71 (86.30) 129.21 (100.26) 111.74 (87.17) 30.18***
Mean per capita household non-food
expenditure (Gh¢)
32.65 (34.02) 25.87 (23.06) 48.57 (58.08) 35.39 (44.89) 47.11***
Mean OOP health expenditure (Gh¢) 7.66 (21.31) 13.02 (34.05) 9.62 (19.79) 9.59 (24.93) 9.29***
Mean OOP health expenditure as % of
non-food expenditure (%)
7.49 (13.09) 9.33 (12.86) 8.77 (11.30) 8.32 (12.57) 4.85***
Households with illness in the last 4 weeks (%) 25.52 (43.61) 44.52 (49.73) 44.93 (49.78) 35.86 (47.97) 50.22***
No. of illness per household in the last
4 weeks (mean)
1.20 (0.55) 1.33 (0.69) 1.21 (0.51) 1.25 (0.59) 4.39**
Having a member with chronic illness (%) 7.61 (26.52) 16.45 (37.10) 19.53 (39.67) 13.23 (33.89) 30.66***
Source: Authors; computed from household survey data, 2011
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the standard deviations of the means
aIn Ghana Cedis. US$1 = 1.5003 in March 2011
bF-test for equal means. *Significant at 10% (p < 0.1); **Significant at 5% (p < 0.05); ***Significant at 1% (p < 0.01)
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Table 4 Incidence and intensity of catastrophic OOP health expenditures relative to non-food expenditure
Threshold level, z
Indicator 20% for all households 40% for all households
Uninsured
(n = 1117)
Partially insured
(n = 620)
Fully insured
(n = 681)
All (n = 2418) P-valuea Uninsured
(n = 1117)
Partially insured
(n = 620)
Fully insured
(n = 681)
All (n = 2418) P-valuea
20% 40%
Head count (%) 10.74 12.74 11.16 11.37 0.444 4.03 3.71 2.94 3.64 0.485
Standard Error (%) 0.93 1.34 1,27 0.64 0.59 0.76 0.65 0.38
Overshoot (%) 2.09 2.09 1.66 1.97 0.467 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.288
Standard Error (%) 0.24 0.33 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.08
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 19.45 16.44 14.86 17.32 0.135 16.69 20.54 14.29 17.16 0.323
Restricted to users of NHIS accredited health facilities for the recent illness/injury
Indicator 20% 40%
Uninsured
(n = 125)
Partially insured
(n = 208)
Fully insured
(n = 251)
All (n = 584) P-valuea Uninsured (n = 125) Partially insured (n = 208) Fully insured (n = 251) All (n = 584) P-valuea
Head count (%) 56.80 25.96 17.53 28.94 0.0000 23.20 10.10 5.98 11.13 0.0000
Standard Error (%) 4.45 3.05 2.40 1.88 3.79 2.09 1.50 1,30
Overshoot (%) 12.35 5.11 3.09 5.79 0.0000 4.23 1.89 0.09 1.98 0.0001
Standard Error (%) 1.49 0.86 0.61 0.53 0.90 0.48 0.33 0.30
Mean Positive Overshoot (%) 21.74 19.68 17.64 20.01 0.4530 18.27 18.68 15.66 17.80 0.7900
Source: Authors; computed from household survey data, 2011
P-values based on F-test for equal means
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Table 5 Logistic regression estimates of the determinants of catastrophic health expenditure (CHE ≥ 40% of non-food expenditure)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
All households Users of NHIS accredited facilities
Odds Ratio 95% CI for OR Odds Ratio 95% CI for OR
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Personal characteristic
No. of under 5 years in household 1.49** 1.07 2.08 1.20 0.80 1.82
No. of ≥70 years in household 1.16 0.62 2.16 1.33 0.63 2.81
Household size (# of persons) 0.90* 0.79 1.02 0.91 0.78 1.07
Health status
Illness per capita (last 4 weeks) 1.24* 0.96 1.60 1.23 0.90 1.69
Having a member with chronic illness (None = 0) 1.94* 0.93 4.03 1.77 0.75 4.20
A member sought heath care from a formal health facility-last 4 weeks 8.49*** 4.70 15.32
A member hospitalised-last 4 weeks 7.08*** 3.63 13.83 7.41*** 3.62 15.17
Health insurance status (Uninsured =0)
Partially insured household 0.35*** 0.18 0.65 0.36*** 0.17 0.73
Fully insured household 0.24*** 0.12 0.49 0.18*** 0.08 0.42
Household/Head characteristics
Residence: Urban (Rural = 0) 0.89 0.46 1.73 0.76 0.34 1.72
Female-headed (male = 0) 1.82* 0.96 3.45 2.25** 1.04 4.87
Marital status of head (never married = 0)
Married/in-union 2.10 0.46 9.65 0.83 0.15 4.47
Divorced/widowed 1.27 0.25 6.42 0.27 0.04 1.76
Education of head (No formal educ = 0)
Primary 0.26** 0.10 0.68 0.40* 0.14 1.15
Junior secondary/middle school 0.51** 0.27 0.96 0.44** 0.20 0.98
Senior secondary or higher 0.77 0.28 2.16 0.47 0.12 1.81
Sector of employment of head (Unemployed = 0)
Formal 1.39 0.36 5.34 1.78 0.32 9.85
Informal 1.35 0.52 3.52 2.01 0.59 6.84
Wealth quintile (First = 0)
Second 0.62 0.32 1.20 0.60 0.26 1.39
Third 0.68 0.33 1.41 0.84 0.35 2.06
Fourth 0.53 0.23 1.22 0.51 0.18 1.48
Fifth 0.45* 0.17 1.15 0.71 0.23 2.19
Health system/community factors
Distance to nearest health facility (Ref = <2km)
Between 2-5 km 1.29 0.63 2.61 1.43 0.61 3.32
More than 5 km 1.99* 0.88 4.50 2.06 0.73 5.81
District (Savelugu-Nanton = 0)
Asutifi 1.64 0.78 3.46 1.03 0.41 2.56
Kwaebibirem 1.92 0.88 4.22 1.04 0.39 2.77
No. of observations 2,418 584
Pseudo R2 0.2661 0.2004
LR test χ2 (df), p-value 201.13 (26) <0.001 81.75 (25) <0.001
H-L goodness-of-fit test (8) χ2; p-value 11.15 0.1936 7.62 0.4711
*Significant at 10% (p < 0.1); **Significant at 5% (p < 0.05); ***Significant at 1% (p < 0.01)
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the Kassena-Nankana district of the Upper East region
of Ghana, Dalaba et al. [44] observed that insured pa-
tients with the NHIS were more likely to seek formal
health care when sick with malaria.
The WHO [4] has observed that elimination of direct
OOP payments at health facilities does not necessarily
remove all the financial barriers to access. This is be-
cause nonmedical expenditures such as travel and sub-
sistence expenses as well as informal payments at the
health facilities could still impede access. We observed
that travelling longer distances to seek health care could
contribute to high OOPHE due to transport cost. While
transport cost is beyond the benefit package of the NHIS,
any improvement in reducing the physical barrier to
health care could help reduce the direct cost of illness.
It has been observed that the ability for a particular
health insurance programme to protect its members
against the financial consequences of ill-health, to a large
extent, depends on its design, the benefit package and
purchasing arrangements with service providers [6]. This
may explain the lack of consistency on whether health
insurance protects against catastrophic health expendi-
tures [6, 11]. In the case of the NHIS, the benefit pack-
age covers about 95% of disease conditions in Ghana yet
some insured patients still made OOP payments even at
NHIS accredited health facilities. One is however not
certain whether these payments were for services or
drugs not covered under the NHIS or they were un-
authorised co-payments. Though this study did not have
explicit information on informal payments at health fa-
cilities, there is anecdotal evidence of informal payments
by insured patients who are sometimes made to make
OOP payments for unapproved prescribed medicines at
NHIS accredited health facilities [22, 24]. While the in-
surance authority has recently established a call centre
for aggrieved clients to call to complain about any un-
authorised co-payments at accredited health facilities, its
effectiveness is yet to be seen. On the issue of medical
supplies, about 12% of the insured and uninsured pa-
tients did not get all their prescribed medicines from the
facilities they visited. The fact that insured patients paid
higher than the uninsured (Gh¢14.27/US$9.51 vs. Gh¢
10.62/US$7.08) for drugs purchased from outside the fa-
cility raises a major concern which requires further in-
vestigations. This is because we do not have any
explanation for this observation. However, ensuring that
NHIS accredited health facilities are stocked with essen-
tial medicines and medical supplies could help reduce
the direct medical cost associated with the purchase of
drugs from outside accredited health facilities.
The treatment seeking behaviour of a patient can also
affect the direct cost of illness. Our results show that
seeking health care from informal sources could be ex-
pensive. Insured patients who sought health care from
informal sources spent Gh¢6.41/US$4.27 which was
closer to the total direct cost of Gh¢6.65/US$4.43 for
seeking formal health care. This is because informal fa-
cilities providing traditional and alternative medicines
are not covered by the NHIS. As the NHIS seeks to ex-
pand its coverage, it can consider granting accreditation
to alternative medicine practitioners who have been ap-
proved to practice by the Ministry of Health in view of
the growing importance of that sub-sector in Ghana’s
health delivery system [45]. The reported high use of in-
formal treatment among the uninsured patients equally
deserves attention perhaps through more public educa-
tion. A similar observation is reported where 33% of the
uninsured patients went directly to the drugstore to buy
medicines when ill without prescription compared to
only 7% among the insured in Ghana [21]. As empha-
sised by van Doorslear et al. [31] impoverishment due to
health payments is ‘more disturbing when it arises from
spending on self-prescribed medicines that have little or
no positive effect’.
At the household level, it was observed that about
3.6% of the households incurred CHE at the 40% thresh-
old. This was comparable to results from similar studies
in Tunisia (4.54%), India (3.44%), Vietnam (5.97%),
Nepal (4.56%) and Kenya (4.6%) [39, 46]. Our results did
not show any significant difference in the incidence of
CHE at the 40% threshold for all the households sur-
veyed. This observation of no significant difference could
be attributed to the fact that many of the uninsured pa-
tients purchased drugs from drugstores where the cost
could be lower for unprescribed drugs. It is known that
households with low incomes and without health insur-
ance could be deterred from using formal health care
services because of the high OOP payments associated
with it. Such households could even forgo treatment or
resort to self-treatment and incur lower OOPHE [4, 35,
47]. For instance, it has been reported that the unin-
sured in the poorest wealth quintile in Ghana are more
likely to forgo treatment when ill [48]. Focusing on
households which used NHIS accredited facilities clearly
reveals the significant financial protection effect of the
NHIS. The fully and partially insured households experi-
enced significantly lower incidence and intensity of
CHE. The positive and significant protective effect of the
NHIS was also confirmed by our results from the regres-
sion analysis of the determinants of CHE. This is con-
sistent with the earlier findings on the subject matter in
Ghana by Nguyen et al. [26].
Notwithstanding the positive effect of the NHIS, the
results show that about 6.0% of fully insured and 10.0%
of the partially insured households experienced CHE
though they used NHIS accredited health facilities. This
is worrying because those households on the average spent
more than 55% of their non-food expenditures on health
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payments as shown by the high mean positive overshoots
(MPOs). It has been argued that OOPHE by households
are involuntary and depending on the magnitude, such ex-
penditures could result in cuts in consumption of basic ne-
cessities which undermines household’s welfare and could
lead to asset sales, running down of savings, indebtedness
and impoverishment [5, 31, 32, 35, 49–51]. The high
MPOs for the partially insured and the fully insured house-
holds could perhaps be attributed to the fact that they re-
ported more illnesses and had a higher proportion of
members with chronic illnesses. The fact that these factors
are significant determinants of the incidence of CHE sug-
gests that the NHIS should re-examine the benefit package
for chronic diseases which are currently not covered.
While this study has provided some highlights on the
financial protection effects of the NHIS, it has some lim-
itations. First of all, OOPHE at the individual level did
not include cost of preventive health seeking though it
was captured in estimating households total OOPHE.
The study did not explore how households which made
catastrophic health payments coped with the situation
and its impoverishment effects, if any. We should also
be mindful that the expenditure data used for the vari-
ous measurements were self-reported by households and
could suffer from recall errors though quality control
measures were adhered to during the data collection ex-
ercise. Secondly, variations in the seasonality of diseases
and income levels in the study districts which could
affect the level OOPHE were not considered. The num-
ber of reported illnesses especially malaria could have
been higher if data had been collected during the raining
season when incomes are also expected to be high be-
cause that is the main agricultural season. But this was
not expected to impact differently on both the insured
and uninsured. Informal payments at health facilities
were not specifically captured because what constituted
informal payment was difficult to ascertained during the
pre-testing of the questionnaire. It was assumed to be
part of the ‘other’ cost category. The study also could
not assess the interactive effects of wealth and health in-
surance in the estimation of the determinants of CHE
because it presented serious multicollinearity problems.
Conclusion
From our results, we can conclude that though the
NHIS had not completely eliminated catastrophic health
expenditures among its members, it provides a signifi-
cant financial protection in times of illness for insured
households. This is consistent with the general observa-
tion that the NHIS is making positive impacts on redu-
cing the financial barriers to health care in Ghana [21,
24, 25]. It is possible to suggest that the ‘savings’ from
the lower direct cost of health services for the insured
could be used for transport to obtain ‘better’ care at
formal health care providers to better their health. It is
believed that improvement in the physical access to
health services, supply of medical supplies and medi-
cines at accredited health facilities and ensuring that
accredited health institutions adhere strictly to the NHIS
benefit package could protect insured households
against the financial consequences of health shocks.
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